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Abstract. This paper examines Hegel’s claim that philosophy “has no other object 
than God” as a claim about the essentiality of the idea of God to philosophy. 
on this idealist interpretation, even atheistic philosophies would presuppose 
rationally evaluable ideas of God, despite denials of the existence of anything 
corresponding to those ideas. This interpretation is then applied to Hegel’s 
version of idealism in relation to those of two predecessors, leibniz and Kant. 
Hegel criticizes the idea of the Christian God present within his predecessors in 
terms of his own heterodox reading of the Trinity in order to resolve a paradox 
affecting them – the “paradox of perspectivism”.
Hegel makes claims about the relation of philosophy to religion that might 
raise concerns for those who want to locate his philosophy generally 
within the modern enlightenment tradition. For example, at the outset of 
his Lectures on Aesthetics he claims that philosophy “has no other object 
but God and so is essentially rational theology”.1 What might seem to 
placate worries here is that Hegel of course differentiates between the 
forms of religious and philosophical cognition in which such a content 
is presented: while religion grasps this content in the form of imagistic 
1 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T. m. Knox (oxford: oxford 
university Press, 1975), p. 101. original German: G. W. F. Hegel, Werke in zwanig 
Bänden, edited by eva moldenhauer and Karl markus michel (Suhrkamp Verlag, 
Frankfurt am main, 1969), vol. 13, p. 139. (Hereafter given in parentheses by volume and 
page numbers.) Philosophy, along with art and religion, belongs to what he refers to as 
“Absolute Spirit”, and these three realms having this same content – God – “differ only 
in the forms in which they bring home to consciousness their object, the Absolute.” Ibid. 
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or figurative representations [Vorstellungen], philosophy grasps it within 
conceptual thought, an attitude which could seem to align him with that 
found within the German enlightenment, for example, as in lessing or 
Kant. However, it seems undeniable that, in comparison to Kant, for 
example, Hegel employs forms of expression for the presentation of his 
own philosophical thought that are redolent with the type of imagistic 
and figurative locutions supposedly at home in religion. moreover, the 
actual imagery employed seems to refer to the type of trinitarian version 
of Christianity that can seem antithetical to those more deistic forms of 
Christian thought that lent themselves to the sort of “demythologization” 
characteristic of the enlightenment attitude to religious doctrine. Such 
factors as these make it easy to portray Hegel’s philosophy as a disguised 
theology with a content from revealed religion, thus aligning him more 
to the spirit of the Counter-enlightenment than the enlightenment.
This may be an easy impression to get, but on examination it is, 
I suggest, a misleading one. Hegel’s attitude to the relation of philosophy 
to religion may not be typical of the enlightenment, but its apparent 
regressive features might be understood from another more favourable 
angle – that of an enlightened critique of the enlightenment attitude to 
religion. In order to consider this other possible way of understanding 
Hegel here, the claim about God being the content of all philosophy 
might be taken as signalling some purportedly irreducible role played 
for Hegel by the idea of God, not just in his own philosophy, but in 
philosophy per se, even in forms of philosophy that deny the existence of 
God. After all, a comprehensive philosophy that rules out the existence 
of God – forms of scientific materialism, for example – presumably must 
have conceptions of that whose existence is being denied. moreover, 
we might think of those contexts in which secular philosophies seem 
to appeal to some quasi-theological idea in making some purportedly 
non-theological point, as when epistemologists frame questions about 
objective knowledge in terms of the “God’s eye view”. It is hardly 
surprising that, being an idealist, Hegel would be concerned with the 
adequacy or otherwise of such ideas, even when the they are not caught 
up with explicitly theological questions of God’s existence.
It is the possibility of reading Hegel’s thoughts on religion in this 
generally “meta-enlightened” way that I shall be concerned with in 
this paper. In its first part, I will quickly sketch in a case for the prima 
facie plausibility of such a claim, and then turn to the significance this 
claim might have for philosophy, were it to be established. The thought 
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here is that if philosophy per se presupposed some idea of God, then, 
presumably, different philosophical orientations might be compared in 
terms of the relative adequacy of those ideas in a way that swings free 
from questions of their commitment to the existence of God. I will then 
go on in the second part of the paper to give this thought more substance 
by comparing the ways different ideas of God function within three 
central figures of the modern idealist tradition, leibniz, Kant and Hegel 
himself.
of course, on the reading I’m suggesting, what is meant by “adequacy” 
here could only be a matter of adequacy in terms of the usual sorts 
of criteria employed in philosophy, such as that of conceptual coherence. 
From the viewpoint of philosophy itself, there presumably could be no 
place for a right conception of God coming from outside philosophical 
thought, say from the content of some particular religious creed or other. 
of course one might still expect the particular ideas of God to be found 
in any individual’s philosophy as having had their origin in particular 
religious or irreligious traditions. Hegel’s idea of God indeed has features 
of the God of the particular confession within which he was raised, a form 
of lutheran Protestantism that seems to have been characteristic of the 
Swabian regions of southern Germany. but this is hardly surprising: 
from where else would one expect them to have come? Hegel of course 
portrays his own religion as the “consummate” religion, but the question 
I’m interested in here is that of the philosophical entitlement Hegel may 
claim in endorsing the particular idea of God found in that religion.2 It 
is in relation to this question that I will examine the use to which he puts 
his idea of God in attempting to resolve problems within the thought 
of his idealist predecessors, leibniz and Kant.
leibniz, a Catholic-leaning lutheran, had devoted considerable 
energy to defending trinitarian Christianity against attacks coming 
from seventeenth-century unitarians or “Socinians”, who appealed to 
what is standardly taken to be a more progressive or rationalistic idea 
of God, a conception of God untroubled by the apparent contradiction 
2 We might think of this distinction as paralleling the familiar one in philosophy of 
science between considerations relevant to the “context of discovery” and those to the 
“context of justification”. That the central idea of some theory, say, came to its discoverer 
in a dream, would by itself hardly warrant dismissing the theory as irrational. Typically, 
it is thought, it is how the scientist goes about establishing and justifying the theory that 
is crucial.
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of the trinity doctrine.3 I will suggest that we can understand Hegel’s 
claim for the superiority of this trinitarian God when we see the way in 
which it can be used to address implicit problems within leibniz’s own 
metaphysics, problems that had been made explicit in the views of Kant. 
ultimately, were it possible to make a case for Hegel’s success here, his 
approach would, I will suggest, be of more than historical relevance. 
Not only can the problems in leibniz and Kant addressed by Hegel be 
recognized within much contemporary philosophy, they can be seen to 
be bound up with similar ideas of God that Hegel wants to challenge 
and replace.4
I. PHIloSoPHY AND THe IDeA oF GoD
I think it can be said that throughout a large part of its history, much 
of what we take as belonging to Western “philosophy” has accepted as 
legitimate appeals to a monotheistically conceived god of one variety or 
another. Consider, for example, the role played by Plato’s artificer in his 
Timeaus, or Aristotle’s prime mover in his Metaphysics. As for medieval 
philosophy, the idea that it was drenched in theological assumptions 
is rarely if ever disputed, and relatively recently historians have turned 
to  the theme of the persistence of this theological content into the 
early modern period.5 moreover, despite the increasing secularization 
of philosophy from the eighteenth century, it’s still not difficult to find 
explicitly theological interpretations of central philosophical ideas well 
into our own time. To give just one example, the british philosopher 
michael Dummett has stated that as a Catholic he is committed to the 
idea of an omniscient God and so to the existence of a world of things 
in themselves that would be the objects of the knowledge had by such 
a God. but as a philosopher, he notes, he is independently committed to 
the existence of things in themselves, and by inference to the existence 
3 on this leibniz commitment to trinitarianism, see maria rosa Antognazza, Leibniz 
on the Trinity and the Incarnation: Reason and Revelation in the Seventeenth Century, 
trans. Gerald Parks, (New Haven: Yale university Press, 2007).
4 What I won’t be doing will be to go on to address the further question of the existence 
of God for Hegel. my sole concern will be with establishing some of the consequences 
that the “the idea” of God will have for an idealist such as Hegel.
5 See, for example, Amos Funkenstein, Theology and The Scientific Imagination from 
the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century (Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1986).
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of an omniscient God, without which, he thinks the notion of a world of 
things in themselves would be meaningless.6
The way in which Dummett conceives of getting to the existence of God 
from philosophical premises may not be common in contemporary 
analytic metaphysics, although even in this domain, claims for theism 
as a philosophically acceptable position seem to have made a very 
definite comeback over the past decades.7 beyond contexts in which 
such explicit theistic content is dealt with, however, it is not difficult to 
find ones in which ideas of God still continue to play important roles. 
besides the ubiquitous “God’s eye point of view” already mentioned, 
one might note the use of the notion of omniscience within the sorts of 
thought experiments that are commonly used in the defence or critique 
of metaphysical theories. As an example of this, we might take Frank 
Jackson’s celebrated case of mary, the fabulously talented neuroscientist 
who has grown up in an entirely black and white environment, and 
who consequently doesn’t know what it is like to see colours such as the 
colour red.8 In Jackson’s thought experiment, mary knows “everything 
there is to know about the physical nature of the world”,9 and yet she 
doesn’t know all there is to know about colour and its perception. before 
leaving her black and white environment, she has something to learn, the 
6 “No one who believes in God can dismiss [the notion of things in themselves], 
however: the way things are in themselves must be the way in which God apprehends 
them. … but can the notion be explained or defended at all without appeal to God’s 
knowledge of the world, and hence by anyone who denies that God exists? In my opinion, 
it cannot: the price of denying that God exists is to relinquish the idea that there is such 
a thing as how reality is in itself.” michael Dummett, The Nature and Future of Philosophy 
(New York: Columbia university Press, 2010), p. 44. 
7 Thus Quentin Smith, in “The metaphilosophy of Naturalism”, Philo: A Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 4, no. 2 (2001), pp. 195–215, has suggested that analytic philosophy has 
undergone the process of desecularization over the last three or four decades sparked 
off by the appearance of Alvin Plantinga’s God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational 
Justification of Belief in God (Ithaca: Cornell university Press, 1967).
8 Frank Jackson, “epiphenomenal Qualia”, The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 127 
(1982), pp. 127–136, and “What mary Didn’t Know”, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 83, 
no. 5 (1986), pp. 291-295.
9 Jackson, “What mary Didn’t Know”, p. 291. “She knows all the physical facts about 
us and our environment, in a wide sense of ‘physical’ which includes everything in 
completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the 
causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles.” 
Ibid. In the earlier paper, Jackson says that she obtains “all the physical information there 
is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like 
‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on”. Jackson, “epiphenomenal Qualia”, p. 130. 
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phenomenal knowledge of what red, for example, looks like.10 The story 
of mary here functions within an argument challenging a metaphysical 
theory, here that of physicalism, and the idea of mary’s local omniscience 
– that is, omniscience about everything that bears on colour vision – is 
crucial. Were mary’s knowledge of the relevant part of the physical world 
limited, the argument would simply not work. “It seems just obvious”, 
Jackson says of mary, regarding her first colour experience, “that she will 
learn something about the world and our visual experience of it. but 
then it is inescapable that her previous knowledge was incomplete. but 
she had all the physical information. ergo there is more to have than 
that, and Physicalism is false”.11
I don’t want to engage with Jackson’s story any further than to note the 
implicit appeal to an idea of God by way of an appeal to a standard property 
of God, that of the attribute of omniscience, even if this omniscience is 
limited to a particular realm – that of colour and colour vision. There 
is, after all, a qualitative difference between the hypothetical mary and 
actual neuroscientists, who, while extremely knowledgeable, are hardly 
omniscient about the topic in question. Jackson’s implicit appeal to this 
theological concept is not like Dummett’s, of course. Dummett appeals to 
an actual God to make meaningful a conception of the world to which he 
is philosophically committed. For Jackson, godly omniscience is invoked 
as a mere logical possibility: all that is needed for his argument is the 
idea of a logically possible world containing the purportedly omniscient 
mary. but I want nevertheless to take this example as instantiating the 
type of point Hegel makes. The logically possible omniscience Jackson 
appeals to is an attribute of a God qua object of a rational theology, and 
it is an idea, moreover, that has a long history. one finds it, for example, 
in both Galileo and Newton as an idealized model for the epistemic goal 
which makes the modern idea of the systematic growth of scientific 
knowledge intelligible.
one example hardly establishes a case, but hopefully what I have said 
might be enough to allow a general idea of how, on this interpretation, 
Hegel’s claim that all philosophy is, or at least contains, a “rational 
theology” might be plausibly pursued, and with this I want to now turn 
10  Jackson’s approach here links to, but has significant differences from, that found in 
Thomas Nagel, “What is it like to be a bat?”, The Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), pp. 435-
50. See, Jackson, “epiphenomenal Qualia”, p. 131, footnote 10. 
11 Jackson, “epiphenomenal Qualia”, p. 130.
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to a sketch of a role played by the idea of God in the respective approaches 
of first, leibniz and Kant, and then, Hegel.
II. THeoloGY AND meTAPHYSICS IN Pre-HeGelIAN IDeAlISm
The eighteenth-century european enlightenment clearly represented 
a major challenge to the generally theistic flavour of much earlier 
philosophy. In Germany the enlightenment attitude to religion was 
generally to portray religion as presenting important truths, in particular 
moral truths, in some indirect, metaphorical or generally figurative way. 
Such an attitude is present in G. e. lessing, for example, who, drawing on 
leibniz’s philosophy, had portrayed the revealed content of Christianity 
to be literally false, but as providing, as one commentator puts it, a “partial, 
perspectival adumbration of this ultimate truth” – that is, the truth 
presented philosophically in leibniz’s monadological metaphysics.12 
Humans as “limited gods” [eingeschrängte Götter], as lessing portrayed 
them,13 are versions of leibniz’s finite monads able to cognize from 
their particular “points of view” what God could grasp from an infinity 
of such points of view. but lessing had added the dimension of an 
historical education for the human species, now portraying the Christian 
myth as containing some truth, but not a truth without qualification 
– rather, truth in a form appropriate for the species at a phase of their 
development, located at some “particular, historically determined point 
of view”.14 It is not difficult to see, however, the problem lurking for this 
approach to metaphysics – if metaphysical knowledge is conceived as 
God’s knowledge, then how is it available to us finite knowers, and so how 
are we to access the standard against which religion is to be compared? 
Kant was famously to make this epistemic problem explicit. For him, 
we finite human cognizers are by necessity incapable of the type of 
knowledge of things in themselves that leibniz’s monadology was meant 
12 Henry Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment: His Philosophy of Religion and Its 
Relation to Eighteenth-Century Thought (Ann Arbor: university of michigan Press, 
1966), p. 133.
13 In a set of notes seemingly written in 1752–3 and later published under the title, “The 
Christianity of reason”, G. e. lessing, Philosophical and Theological Writings, translated 
and edited by H.b. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 2005), p. 28.
14 Allison, Lessing and the Enlightenment, p. 134. This historical development is the 
theme of lessing’s Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts. G. e. lessing, “The education 
of the Human race”, in Philosophical and Theological Writings.
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to instantiate. but it is clear that while leibniz had a problem with the 
idea of any telos of human knowledge, he nevertheless had a powerful 
account of the human capacity to move from more to less perspectival 
cognitions, an idea that was later to be found in Hegel as well as in many 
contemporary forms of philosophical thought. The tools for this were 
contained in leibniz’s particular interpretation of the concepts of “clear” 
and “distinct” ideas.
In one of leibniz’s favourite images from the Christian Platonist 
tradition, humans are “mirrors of God” such that each reflects the entire 
universe as known by God, but in an imperfect way. However, humans 
can perfect their imperfect representations in a process in which initially 
clear but confused ideas are rendered progressively clear and distinct. 
leibniz’s understanding of this notion radically departs from the 
approach of Descartes.15 In a well-known passage from the Discourse on 
Metaphysics leibniz states that “when I can recognize one thing among 
others without being able to say what its differences or properties consist 
in, my knowledge is confused. … but when I can explain the evidence 
I am using, the knowledge is distinct. An assayer’s knowledge is like this; 
he can distinguish true from false gold by means of certain tests or marks 
which make up the definition of gold”.16 but even the assayer’s clear and 
distinct knowledge of gold might be only relatively distinct because the 
component ideas entering into his definition of gold may themselves 
be confused. So, “distinct knowledge has different levels, because the 
notions which enter into the definition usually require definition 
themselves, and are known only confusedly”.17 There would thus seem to 
be a clear parallel between leibniz’s assayer and Jackson’s neuroscientific 
Mary here. mary is like the assayer, we may say, in that what she knows 
of colour goes beyond the clear but confused knowledge that the rest of 
us neuroscientific illiterates have when we recognize and so distinguish 
15 leibniz thus frees the idea of clear and distinct ideas from the ambiguity it has in 
Descartes, replacing Descartes’ modelling of the apprehension of a clear and distinct idea 
on the mind’s phenomenological acquaintance with the particular contents of sensation. 
on this see, Graciela De Pierris, “A Fundamental Ambiguity in the Cartesian Theory 
of Ideas: Descartes and leibniz on Intellectual Apprehension”, Manuscrito: Revista 
Internacional de Filosofia, vol. 30, no. 2 (2007), pp. 383-422. 
16 G. W. leibniz, “Discourse on metaphysics” in Philosophical Texts, trans. and ed. r. 
S. Woolhouse and richard Francks, (oxford: oxford university Press, 1998), § 24.
17 Ibid.
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particular colours, but can’t explain their differences.18 The twist in 
Jackson’s story is that prior to leaving her black and white room, mary 
had only clear and distinct ideas about colour; what she lacked when 
confined to her black and white world were clear and confused ones. 
leibniz is vague, however, as to the telos of this process of the 
perfectibility of human knowledge. In the Discourse on Metaphysics, he 
had defined an adequate idea as one in which “everything which enters 
into a definition or an item of distinct knowledge is known distinctly, 
right down to the primary notions”,19 and had defined intuitive knowledge 
as had when “my mind simultaneously and distinctly understands all the 
primary ingredients of a notion”. However, he notes, “this is very rare: 
most human knowledge is only confused or suppositive”.20 In the later 
Monadology, however, the limitations of human knowledge are more 
strongly pressed: only God can have an adequate or perfect idea from 
which all confusion has been removed.21 We can only achieve clear and 
distinct knowledge in discrete areas – islets of distinct ideas, as it were – 
within a sea of confusion. moreover, God’s complete knowledge of any 
part of the universe will in fact be an idea of the whole universe, as the 
transitions from confused to distinct ideas will contextualize the thing to 
be known in an ever-widening sphere of relations. It is in this sense that 
the substances I perceive confusedly in fact “express” the entire universe: 
“but since all things have a connection with others, either mediately or 
immediately, the consequence is that it is the nature of every substance 
to express the whole universe by its power of acting and being acted 
18 robert Adams points out that while in the 1670s leibniz seemed to believe 
knowledge of the phenomenal quality of colour could not be explained theoretically, 
by the mid 1680s he had come to treat colours as confused phenomena of the sense, 
regarding them as complex rather than simple qualities. robert merrihew Adams, “The 
Priority of the Perfect in the Philosophical Theology of the Continental rationalists”, in 
michael Ayers (ed.), Rationalism, Platonism and God (oxford: oxford university Press, 
2007), pp. 110–111.
19 leibniz, “Discourse on metaphysics”, § 24.
20 Ibid., first emphasis added.
21 “because, in organizing the whole, God has regard to every part, and specifically to 
ever monad; and since a monad is representative in its nature, nothing could restrict it to 
representing only a part of things. but it is of course true that this representation of the 
details of the whole universe is confused, and can only be distinct with respect to a small 
part of things, namely those which are either closest or largest in relation to each monad. 
otherwise every monad would be divine. … They all reach confusedly to infinity, to 
everything; but they are limited and differentiated by their level of distinct perception.” 
G. W. leibniz, monadology, § 60, in Philosophical Texts, p. 276. 
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on, that is, by the series of its own immanent operations”.22 This brings 
into focus a further position on the continuum on which we find the 
distinction between clear and confused and clear and distinct cognitions. 
When I perceive some substance, say, this plant before me, in a clear 
but confused way, I am in fact grasping the universe itself, although not 
consciously. In leibniz’s epistemic taxonomy I am perceiving it in an 
obscure way.23
but this now establishes a tension within the idea of the relation of 
human to divine knowledge – that is, in relation to an entirely distinct 
idea of the world that God, as omniscient, represents – and so the idea 
of the very possibility of metaphysical knowledge itself. How can we be 
possibly entitled to the account presented in leibniz’s own monadology if 
we are somehow ultimately bound to our finite perspectives? If, as God’s 
creatures, we are necessarily limited to confused ideas about substances 
and obscure ideas of the universe itself, how are we to know what the 
world might be like for God?24 unable to form a distinct aperspectival 
idea of the whole against which my view can be grasped as confused and 
perspectival, how can I be self-conscious of my own perspectivity? We 
might call this problem the paradox of “perspectivism”.
Kant’s response to this leibnizian paradox was simple in that he 
replaced the vague quantitative difference between human and divine 
knowledge with a qualitative one between distinct forms of knowledge. 
Kant thus portrays God as a being capable of the rational intuition of 
22 G. W. leibniz, “A Specimen of Discoveries About marvellous Secrets”, in 
Philosophical Writings, ed. G. H. r. Parkinson, trans mary morris and G. H. r. Parkinson 
(london: Dent, 1973), p. 84.
23 leibniz had used the obscure cognitions in the 1684 publication “mediations on 
Knowledge, Truth, and Ideas”, in Philosophical Essays, trans. roger Ariew and Daniel 
Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), where he notes that “a notion which is not sufficient 
for recognizing the thing represented is obscure, as, for example, if whenever I remember 
some flower or animal I once saw, I cannot do so sufficiently well for me to recognize 
that flower or animal when presented and to distinguish it from other nearby flowers or 
animals”. Ibid., pp. 23–4. The notion of obscure ideas is found in ralph Cudworth, True 
Intellectual System of the Universe (london: richard royston, 1678, facsimile reprint, 
Hildeschiem: Georg olms Verlag, 1977), p. 160.
24 leibniz’s later writings seem to admit of contradictory “corporeal” and “idealist” 
readings of the monadology – an ambiguity might be seen as reflecting this problem. For 
a defence of the traditional “idealist” reading of leibniz see robert merrihew Adams, 
Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist (oxford: oxford university Press, 1994), and for a 
thorough-going critique, see Pauline Phemister, Leibniz and the Natural World: Activity, 
Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
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“things in themselves”, while we humans have to rely on our being causally 
effected by worldly substances, the resulting sensations produced in us 
being somehow incorporated into representational structures to which 
we have contributed the forms. Without these representational forms 
contributed by us, we can have no knowledge at all; but the fact that we 
are the source of the forms of what is known means that what we know is 
never the world as it is “in itself ”. leibniz had distinguished the knowledge 
of the world as phenomena, achievable in science, from the deeper level 
of metaphysical knowledge underlying and explaining the phenomena, 
but Kant now limits our theoretical knowledge to the former, understood 
as the systematically organized knowledge of appearances.
In short, Kant clarified what had been vague and ambiguous in leibniz’s 
approach, concerning the relation of human to divine knowledge. but the 
resulting scepticism over the status of metaphysical knowledge of things 
in themselves posed well-known problems for Kant. First, leibniz’s 
paradox of perspectivism seems to re-emerge, as is captured in Jacobi’s 
famous quip about Kant’s “things in themselves”. Without this notion, 
claimed Jacobi, one cannot enter the system of Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, but with it one could not remain within it.25 Jacobi could thereby 
draw further consequences of this for the familiar lessingian attitude to 
the relation of religious myth to philosophy. From Jacobi’s point of view, 
by reducing them to appearances, Kant has denied us knowledge of even 
the most fundamental objects of experience. realism about the everyday 
world is thus underpinned by a kind of faith. but if belief in the reality of 
even such everyday objects requires a kind of faith, why cannot this faith 
be extended to belief in God.26 once lessing’s construal of religion as 
a partial and perspectival figurative representation of the world in itself, 
which reflects the limitations of our spatial and temporal location in 
the world has been deprived of its philosophical contrast – a knowledge 
of things in themselves – what is there to prevent it from being simply 
accepted as the best we can achieve?27 
25 Thus Jacobi notes that “das ich ohne jene Voraussetzung in das System nicht 
hineinkommen, und mit jener Voraussetzung darinn nicht bleiben konnte”. Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. Ein 
Gespräch (breslau: G. loewe, 1787), beilage, p. 223.
26 As is often pointed out, Jacobi could purport to employ Hume in this affirmation 
of a fundamentally fideistic outlook because the German word “Glaube” blends the 
meanings of both “belief ” and “faith”. 
27  There had been, after all, a long tradition within Christian theology of appeals to analogy 
and other figurative forms of thought in the attempt to characterize religious knowledge itself.
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Kant’s sceptical epistemology of metaphysical knowledge had 
opened a space within which overtly counter-Enlightenment dogmatic 
reassertions of religious dogma could return, but Kant could respond 
to this in a distinctive way by boldly relocating the metaphysical project 
itself within the domain of practical rather than theoretical reason, and 
treating religious content as a figurative presentation of this distinctly 
moral knowledge. Thus, for Kant, while it is impossible for us to 
determine our beliefs entirely rationally without any empirical input, it is 
nevertheless possible for each of us as finite rational beings to determine 
our wills in this way. We can know how we ought to act from reason, and 
can be motivated to act in such ways from reason, even though we can 
never be assured from some theoretical perspective of how it is we can 
do this. Distinctly moral knowledge of how to act is formulated in the 
linguistic form of the imperative, not that of the declarative, giving Kant 
an alternative to the idea of metaphysical knowledge as representation of 
the world. As a consequence, Kant could now reinterpret the generally 
lessingian model of religious myth as an indirect form of knowledge, 
and as such as subordinate to conceptual knowledge, albeit conceived 
as practical rather than theoretical.28 Kant was able, we might say, to 
square the lessingian circle, demythologizing religion without the need 
to contrast it with a positive metaphysical content that literalizes its 
figurative claims. Hegel’s thought, I suggest, started from a similar place, 
but rapidly veered in a different direction, allowing him more adequately 
to confront the paradox of perspectivism.
III. HeGel oN “rePreSeNTATIoN”
like Kant, Hegel discusses religion as involving a type of symbolic 
presentation of truths that in philosophy are expressed purely 
conceptually. While the form of this content in religion is Vorstellung, 
28 Thus portraying religious representation as in a generally symbolic mode, Kant could 
portray Jesus as a type of moral “prototype” in whom we could recognize the morality 
of which we ourselves capable. That is, what we recognize in Jesus when we figuratively 
represent him as the “son of God” is a prototype that “is nowhere to be sought except 
in our reason”. Immanuel Kant, “religion within the boundaries of mere reason”, in 
Religion and Rational Theology, translated and edited by Allen W. Wood and George Di 
Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1996), p. 106. (original German in 
Kants Gesammelte Schriften (berlin: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1900-), 
vol. 6, p. 64. Hereafter, pagination to the German original will be given in the form, 6:64.)
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“representation”, in philosophy it attains the form of thought. but while 
it might be thought that this distinction comes down to something like 
a distinction between “figurative” and “literal” truths, this is not the case. 
representation is, Hegel says in the 1827 Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion “a consciousness of something that one has before oneself as 
something objective”,29 and in his discussion of theoretical spirit in the 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit from around the same time he notes 
that “the content of representation is given, it is something immediately 
found [Vorgefundenes]. … In representation there is a sensible, immediate 
givenness, and the element of freedom, namely, that this content is my 
representation. ... However I have not made the content. The content 
possesses an element of immediacy, givenness, of not being posited 
through my freedom”.30
For Hegel, representation as such is not at all a cognitive mode that is 
exclusive to religious thought, it is simply the form that a cognitive content 
takes in everyday life, the prototype of which is the way in which some 
thinkable content is made present as sensible and immediate in perception, 
in which we understand some thinkable content as simply given and, as 
it were, forced upon us. It is this prototypically perceptual content that 
is captured in the “images” that Hegel thinks of as the principle mode of 
representational content and as “taken from immediate intuition”.31 For 
Hegel, I suggest, “representation” plays something of the same role as 
played in leibniz by the idea of something known in a clear but confused 
way. Religion is representational because in it some universal content is 
made present for thought by, as it were, piggy-backing in a  figurative 
or metaphorical way on this everyday type of representational vehicle. 
When some perceptual content is reproduced in images, Hegel says in 
29 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, one-Volume edition, The 
lectures of 1827, edited by Peter C. Hodgson, translated by r. F. brown, P. C. Hodgson, 
and J. m. Stewart, with the assistance of H. S. Harris, (berkeley: university of California 
Press, 1988), p. 144. original German: G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen: Ausgesählte 
Nachschriften und Manuskripte, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix meiner Verlag, 
1983–5), vol. 3, p. 292. Hereafter given in the form V followed by volume and page 
number.
30 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, 1827–8, translated with an 
introduction by robert r. Williams, (oxford: oxford university Press, 2007), p. 213. 
original German, Hegels Vorlesungen über die Geistes 1827/8, ed. Franzo Hespe and 
burkhard Tuschling (Hamburg: meiner Verlag, 1994), pp. 195–6, hereafter given in 
parentheses as “VG” followed by page number. 
31 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 1827, p. 145 (V3:293).
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the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, “we are directly conscious 
that they are only images but that they have a significance distinct from 
that which the image as such primitively expresses – that the image is 
something symbolic or allegorical and that we have before us something 
twofold, first the immediate and then what is meant by it its inner 
meaning”. “Thus”, he goes on, “there are many forms in religion about 
which we know that they are only metaphors”.32
religion uses the vehicles of everyday representational contents in 
order to present its truths, and this very fact reveals that the distinction 
between the literal and the figurative is one made within the mode of 
representation. A photograph of a gleaming new car can represent that 
particular car, or more generally, the model exemplified by that particular 
car, or, figuratively, abstract entities like wealth or a lavish lifestyle. but 
it can express these more general meanings because in the first place it 
can represent that car itself: as Freud purportedly claimed, “sometimes 
a cigar is just a cigar”.33 In short, the distinction between literal and 
figurative is one that works within “representation”, rather than between 
representation and thought. but if the philosophical conceptual 
reinscription of religious content cannot be thought of as the transition 
from figurative to literal meaning, how should it be conceived? The clue 
to this is to be found, I suggest, in the type of movement that leibniz 
thinks of in terms of making clear and confused ideas clear and distinct.
In the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion Hegel says that thought 
“dissolves the form of the simple, in which the content is found in 
representation, in such a way that distinct determinations within this 
simple reality are grasped and exhibited so that it is known as something 
inwardly manifold”.34 This theme of thought’s taking apart of the apparently 
simple givennesses of representation is similarly found in the Lectures on 
the Philosophy of Spirit. “I have a representation of something; this means 
that I do not yet know the object in its specificity. Definition requires 
that I state the species, the universal, and also state the determinacy, 
the essential determination. In so doing, I have gone beyond the form 
of representation to the determination of the concept.”35 moving from 
a simple experience or representation of something to a form of thought 
32 Ibid., p. 145–6 (V3:293).
33 This is, I believe, apocryphal. 
34 Ibid., p. 152 (V3:299).
35 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, 1827–8, pp. 213–4 (VG:196).
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involving its conceptual articulation in terms of a definition combining 
a universal and its relevant differentiae is just what leibniz had thought 
of in terms of making a clear but confused idea clear and distinct. In 
more contemporary terms, it is what Jackson means by the transition 
from the perspectivally limited experiential knowledge of coloured 
things to a scientific understanding of them. like Kant, Hegel thinks 
of perceptual experience as implicitly structured by concepts, and it 
is this implicit conceptuality of experience that is made explicit when 
I make a judgment on the basis of experience, and express this judgment 
in words. but this is to bring the perceptual content into the “space of 
reasons”, that is, to give it a logical form that enables the judgment to be 
inserted into a chain of reasoning – an inference. However, this must 
involve a certain loss, since the singular terms that purportedly would 
pick out the phenomenal properties of whatever it is I’m perceiving have 
no place in such a thinkable content. When I raise to thought that which 
appears as this, here, now, I have left the perspectival singularity it has 
as experienced, behind. As with leibniz, for Hegel the movement from 
representation to thought looks like a movement towards the type of 
knowledge that is traditionally attributed to God.36 Kant had responded 
to the ambiguity of leibniz on the relation of human to divine knowledge 
by drawing a boundary between these two possible forms of knowledge. 
Hegel’s response, I suggest, is by way of a criticism of the implicit idea of 
God that Kant accepts in making this very demarcation.
IV. THe IDeA oF GoD IN KANT AND HeGel
In the section of the Critique of Pure Reason on the “transcendental 
ideal” or “transcendental prototype”,37 Kant portrays the “idea of God” as 
generated from a type of inferential thinking whose form is captured by 
the disjunctive syllogism. In theoretical reason, “ideas”, that is, concepts 
regulating inferential thought processes, are limited to this regulative 
36 For an account of the way in which leibniz conceives of our knowledge of the 
mysteries of revealed religion as a form of clear but confused cognition see marcelo 
Dascal, “reason and the mysteries of Faith: leibniz on the meaning of religious 
Discourse” in Leibniz: Language, Signs and Thought. A Collection of Essays (Amsterdam: 
John benjamins, 1987), pp. 93-124.
37 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated and edited by Paul Guyer and 
Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1998), Division two, book II, 
Chapter III, section II.
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function, and deprived of any knowledge-forming or predicative function. 
under the influence of the transcendental illusion, however, these 
“ideas” are taken as representing some kind of supersensible thing. Here, 
the idea organizing the rational relations among all determinate objects 
captured by the disjunctive syllogism is taken as designating a “highest 
being” which provides the ground of all finite things. more specifically, 
the “ideal” of God results from the “realization”, “hypostatization” and 
“personalization” of this properly formal set of relations holding among 
all completely conceptually determined objects.38 It is easy to recognize 
various candidate gods in Kant’s description. Simply realizing the idea, 
as in Kant’s idea of the omnitudo realitatis, would result in something 
like Spinoza’s absolute substance with its two attributes of thought 
and extension. Further personalizing the idea would now represent it 
in more anthropomorphic terms, as traditional personalistic forms of 
monotheism, and perhaps hypostatizing would result in something like 
the traditional Christian trinitarian conception of God, with its multiple 
“persons”.39 but for Kant such sensibilized ideas of God can play no 
epistemic role at all. As far as the trinitarian view of God goes, he points 
out later in The Conflict of the Faculties, when taken literally this doctrine 
“has no practical relevance at all … Whether we are to worship three or 
ten persons in the Deity makes no difference”.40 It is only when we read 
a specifically moral meaning into this article of faith that it would contain 
an intelligible belief that “refers to our moral vocation”. For example, in 
Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, the trinity is seen as 
symbolizing the various relations within which an individual stands to 
the moral law which it simultaneously legislates and obeys,41 and the 
same interpretative approach holds true of the associated doctrine of 
the incarnation. Were we to think of the Deity as “‘dwelling incarnate’ 
in a real human being and working as a second nature in him, then we 
can draw nothing practical from this mystery: since we cannot require 
ourselves to rival a God, we cannot take him as an example”.42 It is only by 
38 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A583/b611n.
39 The Nicene Creed had settled on an account of the trinity as three “hypostases” in 
one “ousia”.
40 Immanuel Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties”, in Religion and Rational Theology, 
p. 264 (7:39).
41 Immanuel Kant, “religion Within the boundaries of mere reason”, in Religion and 
Rational Theology, pp. 166–7 (6:140–2).
42 Kant, “The Conflict of the Faculties”, in Religion and Rational Theology, p. 265 (7:39).
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taking Jesus “as the Idea of Humanity in its full moral perfection, present 
in God from eternity and beloved by him”,43 rather than as an actual man 
who is God, that we could take his life as embodying moral examples we 
could follow.
Hegel likewise thinks of the doctrines of the Trinity and the 
Incarnation as employing figurative forms of thought, but for him the 
significance of this content so presented could not be more different, 
being representational presentations of important metaphysical truths 
no longer restricted to the realm of morals. Hegel is critical of the idea 
of reducing the significance of Jesus to the status of anything like a moral 
exemplar: rather, the significance of the doctrine of Jesus as the second 
person of the trinity resides in the fact that God necessarily assumes 
human form and, thereby, suffers and dies. “God has died, God is dead”, 
Hegel famously declares in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion 
from 1831, and goes on “this is the most frightful of all thoughts”. That 
the death of a man signifies God’s death is, of course, a representation, 
and a more conceptual way of expressing this truth is to be found in 
Hegel’s further expansion of the idea in the claim “that everything 
eternal and true is not, that negation itself is found in God”.44 Four years 
earlier, quoting the words “God himself is dead” from the lutheran 
hymn of Johannes rist, Hegel interprets these words as expressing “an 
awareness that the human, the finite, the fragile, the weak, the negative 
are themselves a moment of the divine, that they are within God himself, 
that finitude, negativity, otherness are not outside of God and do not, as 
otherness, hinder unity with God. otherness, the negative, is known to 
be a moment of the divine nature itself. This involves the highest idea 
of spirit.”45
on the logical issue of negation, Hegel’s thought stands in stark 
contrast to that of Kant, who in his discussion of the idea of God in “The 
Transcendental Ideal” says that “all negations … are mere limitations 
of a greater and finally of the highest reality; hence they presuppose 
43 Ibid. That is, “present in God” as an idea. Kant thus gives to the trinity doctrine 
a singularly “immanent” meaning, without reference to creation.
44 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, vol. III, The Consummate religion, 
edited by Peter C. Hodgson, translated by r. F. brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. m. Stewart, 
with the assistance of H. S. Harris (berkeley: university of California Press, 1985), 
p. 323n (17:291). 
45 Ibid., 326 (17:297).
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it, and as regards their content they are merely derived from it.”46 As 
Henry Allison points out, with this claim Kant accepts the logical and 
ontological prioritization “of realities or positive predicates over negative 
ones”.47 We can appreciate this fact when we see how, if one simply 
“realizes” Kant’s idea of God as the ground of all determinations, without 
further “hypostatizing” or “personalizing” it, one seems to find Spinoza’s 
divine substance in which all determinations are negations of a single 
positively conceived substance. but Hegel criticizes this prioritizing of 
positive concepts over negative ones, as he criticizes, for example, the 
“affirmative principle” found in Plato in which the Idea is conceived “as 
only abstractly identical with itself ”, and praises Aristotle for making 
conspicuous “the moment of negativity, not as change, nor yet as nullity, 
but as difference or determination”.48 
This critique of the logical principle of abstract self-identity can be 
seen in Hegel’s attraction to the portrayal of the Trinity in the writings of 
46 “Thus all the possibility of things … is regarded as derivative, and only that which 
includes all reality in it is regarded as original. For all negations (which are the sole 
predicates through which everything else is to be distinguished from the most real being) 
are mere limitations of a greater and finally of the highest reality; hence they presuppose 
it, and as regards their content they are merely derived from it.” Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, A578/b606.
47 Henry Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, 
revised and expanded edition (Ann Arbor: Yale university Press, 2004), p. 399. The 
priority of “positive” over “negative” determinations in Kant is already signalled by 
his treatment of the categories of “reality” and “negation” from the “Transcendental 
Analytic”. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A80–3/b106–9. 
48 G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 volumes, trans. e. S. Haldane 
and Frances H. Simson (lincoln: university of Nebraska Press, 1995), vol. II, p. 140 
(19.153). The position that Hegel describes in terms of the priority of the affirmative 
principle can be seen as the view that laurence Horn describes as the “asymmetricalist” 
position on the relation of positive and negative statements, asymmetricalists regarding 
negative statements as “less primitive, less informative, less objective, less godly, and/or 
less valuable than their affirmative counterparts.” laurence r. Horn, A Natural History of 
Negation (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1989), p. 3. Horn describes Plato, when 
speaking through the “stranger” of the Sophist as “introduc[ing] two of the recurring 
themes of our history: the view that negation can be eliminated by defining it away in 
terms of the (putatively) positive concept of otherness or difference, and the observation 
that negative statements are in some sense less valuable than affirmative ones, in being 
less specific or less informative.” ibid, p. 1. Hegel’s most obvious target when he attacks the 
concept of identity that goes with the “affirmative principle” would seem to be leibniz. 
more recently, the principle of identity stressed by Frege, when understood objectually 
rather than metalinguistically – the principle that every thing is identical with itself – 
might be thought of as a more recent version.
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the Christian mystic, Jacob böhme.49 While Hegel certainly considered 
böhme’s expression “barbaric” and in need of translation into conceptual 
form,50 he nevertheless considered his account of the Trinity as capturing 
the basic shape of the “thought determinations” or categories of his 
own logic. Thus böhme’s exclusive idea, “the thought that permeates 
all his works – is that of perceiving the holy Trinity in everything, and 
recognizing everything as its revelation and manifestation, so that it is 
the universal principle in which and through which everything exists”.51
In böhme’s triune deity, at least as Hegel portrays it, considered in 
abstraction the first person or “Father” is indeterminate and hidden, 
more akin to “the Neo-Platonic unity … without knowledge of itself and 
likewise unrecognized”,52 than a “person” with a personalistic will akin to 
the old Testament God who had willed the material world into existence.53 
In contrast, the Son is the “I”, “the word, the Separator, revelation ... the 
source of all difference”, and importantly “the will and implicit being 
which are in the powers of all natural things”.54 Hegel stresses the böhme’s 
anti-transcendent identification of the Son with the “powers of all natural 
things” by referring to böhme’s “pantheism of the Trinity”.55 The divine 
is present in all things, but in particular human beings, as böhme makes 
clear attacking deniers of the Trinity: “You say, there is but one being 
in God, and that God has no Son. open your eyes and consider your 
selves ... behold the inward man, and then thou wilt see it most plainly 
and clearly ... this is the Son which is born in thee.”56 böhme in this way 
represents the “Protestant principle” of “placing the intellectual world 
49 According to Hegel’s nineteenth-century english translator, elizabeth Haldane, for 
Hegel the “point of greatest interest in reading böhme is the fact that he was able to discover 
that the conception of abstract identity then in vogue was valueless”. elizabeth S. Haldane, 
“böhme and his relation to Hegel”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 6, 2 (1897), p. 153.
50 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. III, p. 210 (20:113).
51 Ibid., p. 196 (20:98–9). “In such a way … all things have this divine Trinity in 
themselves, not as a Trinity pertaining to the ordinary conception but as the real Trinity 
of the absolute Idea. everything that exists is, according to boehme, this three-fold alone, 
and this three-fold is everything”. Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 198 (20:101). In particular Hegel links böhme’s Father to Proclus’ “one”. 
Ibid. (20:100–1). 
53 We might then think of böhme’s one as akin to the universe as a whole when 
grasped as an “obscure” idea in leibniz, that is, as that which is presupposed as the reality 
behind any clear and confused idea.
54 As quoted by Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. III, p. 202 (20:105).
55 Ibid., p. 170 (20:70).
56 Ibid., p. 213 (20:115).
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within one’s own mind and heart, and of experiencing and knowing and 
feeling in one’s own self-consciousness all that formerly was conceived 
as a beyond”.57 Portraying the Son both as an I (ich) and as nothingness 
(Nichts) by the word play “Icht” – böhme, says Hegel, had made explicit 
the “true negativity is the ‘I’”.58 In line with this, böhme calls the one or 
the Father “the Yes” and the Son “the No” and notes that this one “as 
the Yes ... would be unknowable in Himself ... without the No. The No is 
a counter-stroke of the Yes, or of the truth”.59 This is why any intelligence 
or willing (“the word” or “the logos”) is associated with the Son and not 
the Father – that is, associated with the finite being who dies.60
All this, of course, must have consequences for the traditional idea of 
God as omniscient, as this idea is dependent on a picture of God that is 
simultaneously personalistic and transcendent – the imagined occupant 
of the philosopher’s “God’s eye view”. Hegel’s Neoplatonic–böhmist 
reading of the Trinity has simply done away with the prototype of such 
a possible knower. of course the finitude of all knowing signalled by the 
“death of God” does not do away entirely with the idea of transcending 
the  finite conditions of knowing. As had leibniz, Hegel thinks of the 
passage from immediate perceptual judgments to more mediated ones 
via the unpacking of implicit inferential relations within the semantic 
contents of concepts as a movement that transcends the conditions 
governing the former. but these movements can no longer be pictured 
as converging on some final “God’s eye view” or “view from nowhere”, 
the positivity of which one might appeal to in order to capture what is 
deficient in those finite modes of knowing.
To attempt to trace the full consequences of Hegel’s move would take 
us well beyond the scope of a short paper, but we might start to grasp 
one consequence it might have by returning to the idea of omniscience as 
we have seen it implicit in Jackson’s thought experiment involving mary. 
The metaphysical dilemma generated by the story of mary was that she, 
surely, learns something on leaving her black and white room: she learns 
what colours are like. but her knowledge had purportedly been complete, 
so surely, we want to say, her objective knowledge must not have been 
57 Ibid., p. 191 (20:94). 
58 Ibid., p. 206 (20:109).
59 Ibid., p. 209 (20:112).
60 of course the “Holy Ghost” the third person of the trinity, represents the union of 
the Father and the Son, but this does not detract from the main point – Hegel’s criticism 
of the construal of the God of classical monotheism as a type of large Cartesian mind.
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all the knowledge there was to be had. but this produces a paradox, 
and the paradox, it would seem, comes from the Kantian conception 
of omniscience presupposed. It seemed as if mary, like God the Father, 
could only extend and so “complete” her knowledge by foregoing 
knowledge – that is, by accepting the partial, limited and perspectival 
type of knowledge characteristic of humans into a body of already 
perfected knowledge. but this is incoherent – the God representing 
that epistemic telos must have been a false one, and should be replaced 
by a better one, a conception of a God who already contains negation 
and limitation within himself. And, of course, if we are, as in leibniz’s 
metaphor, “mirrors of God”, Hegel’s reconfigured idea of God must have 
consequences for our conception of ourselves and our own capacities.
Hegel’s new idea of God – a God who necessarily comes into the 
world as a finite man with real but finite powers of self-transcendence 
– provides us with a new image in which we can recognize ourselves. 
In this new image, we see the movement characteristic of our own 
rationality, the movement from sensuous immediacy to the concept, 
but as reversed as in a mirror. That is, if our characteristic movement is 
to move away from sensuousness to the mediation of concepts, God’s 
characteristic movement starts by going in the opposite direction: like 
mary leaving her black and white room, God moves “down” to us, as 
it were, mirroring our climbing the conceptual tree and “going up” to 
him. but the next phase of the trinitarian moving image, has Christ, 
the anthropomorphous God, leaving us to reunite with his father after 
death, so as to complete him. Consequently, if I am to think of myself 
as something like an inversion of this triune God, I should think of my 
characteristic movement as involving an essential moment of return 
to the limited sensuous existence from which I started. In short, I’m 
encouraged to give up the effectively idolatrous or perhaps fetishistic 
idea, that reason is going to liberate me completely from the finitude of 
human existence, including the finitude of my epistemic existence. Here, 
as elsewhere, for Hegel the true religion is the enemy of idolatry and false 
gods. but Hegel’s doctrine of the death of God is not the familiar nihilism 
often associated with this Vorstellung. one’s return to the finite, as in the 
mirror image of Christ’s return to his father, does not leave the starting 
point untransformed. We should resist the lure that conceptual thought 
will take us to a place free of the limitations of our finite being: the God 
of that conception is dead. but, grasped in the right way, thought and 
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reason can, nevertheless, orient us within our finitude in ways that, by 
our capacity to conceptualize and reconceptualize our world, ourselves, 
and our goals, local limitations can be overcome, false gods dispelled, 
and our finite lives enriched. Something like this seems to be at the heart 
of the metaphysical consequences of Hegel’s theology.
